

**Intentions governing Southern Hemisphere Migration: How  
migrants' preferences illustrate the different orientation of three  
national groups towards their homelands**

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## **Abstract**

This study investigates Australian, New Zealand and South African migrants' preferences when considering their return migration. It uses a variety of data collection techniques including an online questionnaire and a series of semi-structured interviews. The study analyses the data as well as comparing them to other surveys conducted such as those by South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), South African Migration Project (SAMP), Southern Cross Group and the 2001 Census. From this a picture of the migrants' orientation towards their homeland is constructed.

This study is written using current geographical literature as a foundation; the work by Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc (1994; 1995) provides the structure for identifying transnational migration, the category into which the majority of the migrants within this survey fall. Findlay (1995) identifies 'invisible migrants', those which have no perceived drain to either the host or sending nation, whilst Crush (2000) discusses the 'Brain Drain' from South Africa both relevant studies as they provide background to the types of migrant and give initial ideas about their orientation towards their homeland, some of which are affirmed within my study.

The study then builds on the current state of the literature by discussing migrants' preferences in relation to age gender and education. Does the migration reflect the different characteristics of the sample? The historical links between the two countries are examined, and possible migration policies are discussed in relation to the different factors that migrants expressed as important in their migration decisions

## **Introduction**

The aim of this dissertation is to examine the links between nationality, age, gender, education and how they impact upon return migration intentions of people from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The migrant priorities when considering return migration are investigated and their orientation to their homeland, and the differences between the three groups are discussed. It is a comparative study measuring statistically whether there are links between the above factors, and how the groups can be separated according to nationality.

The issue of migration is not a new one but as globalisation continues, migration studies are likely to increase in relevance as migration becomes a necessary part of many people's lives. Social arrangements, and migration as a type of social arrangement, are not natural phenomenon, rather an anthropogenic feature and therefore able to be changed by man (Smith, 1995).

The actual method of migration is not focused on within this discussion; instead the more common method has been adopted in line with the greater part of the literature, studying why people migrate rather than how they migrate (Faist, 2000). The South

African Migration Project (SAMP) cites crime and safety levels, political instability, affirmative action, economic stagnation and taxation in South Africa as reasons why people migrate. This discussion aims to investigate factors causing return migration and ask whether there is any difference between the dominant factors of the South African, Australian and New Zealand Diasporas in terms of factors affecting the decision to migrate back to their country of origin.

Through the course of this study there are associations between age, nationality and sex and migration priorities in terms of future movements and motivation behind future movements. This discussion will supplement the data that has already been gathered on return migration and the 'Brain Drain'. By considering the different policies adopted by the respective governments, the effectiveness of their policies on return migration can be judged in relation to the policies of the other two governments. The conclusions discuss what the governments could learn from each other in stimulating return migration.

This study feeds into debates about invisible migrants and return migration, providing a critique of current literature and policy on the subject of return migration, looking at the effectiveness of current policy and possible policy changes.

## **International Migration**

This work enters the arena for discussion as a result of the state of the current literature. The topic of international migration can be split into the subheadings below in order to analyse the contributions that each of these sub-divisions makes to the overall research. There is, to a greater or lesser extent, literature on all of the subheadings below. However, there is a comparative lack of information on the intentions that govern return migration. Instead the literature concentrates on the social implications of migrants returning to their home communities (Gmelch & Richling, 1986; Gmelch, 1986; Nutter, 1986) or on government intervention into return migration (Lawless, 1986). The research on return migration such as that by Byron and Condon (1996) or Cerase (1974) is important when discussing the implications of return migration and leads into my research. By looking at what happens when migrants return Byron and Condon (1996), Cerase (1974) and Condon and Ogden (1984) show the social consequences of return migration. Looking at factors that govern their intentions to return is a gap in the literature that my research covers.

What follows is an examination of the existing literature and limited research concerning return migration and possible reasons. Chapter 4 gives results and involves discussion of the results, leading to conclusions being reached in Chapter 5.

## **2.1 Transnationalism**

Much of the literature concentrates on migration becoming increasingly complex in contemporary times (Basch, Glick-Schiller & Blanc, 1994; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998). As globalisation and transnationalism increase so to does the intricacy of migration; “movement is not a one-time event but rather a dynamic process consisting of a sequence of events across time” (Faist, 2000: 57). This view is supported throughout the literature with Castles and Miller (2003) making reference to formal and informal networks, numerous types of immigration and finally to a UN survey where it was estimated that just over 2% of the world’s population had lived outside their country of birth for a minimum of 12 months.

The change in international migration discourse started in the early 1990s where Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc started to develop theories as to whether there are differences between migrants who remain in touch with their home country and those who assimilate to a greater extent. From this the development moved to cover transnational migrants and to what degree they are different from other migrants. When this subject was first discussed much was made of reclassifying the majority of global migrants to label them as transnational migrants. However, the initial furore decreased and it was accepted that there are certain actions that signify whether a migrant is transnational (Stalker, 2001). It is also prudent to be wary of transnational

migration as a sweeping new movement; “often, of course, new forms of migration turn out to be older forms in a fresh disguise” (Castles, 1995: 507).

There have been a number of discussions as to possible reasons for migration. The initial reason is capitalism and its economic impacts; “it attributes international migration to the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral non-capitalist societies, and its disruptive consequences create a mobile population prone to migrate” (Joly, 2000: 27). This idea of migration due to economic reasons is not uncommon, especially in migration from LDCs to Western Europe and North America; “other emigrants are simply attracted by the higher salaries in the developed countries” (Adepoju, 2003: 17).

However, economics is not the only reason behind migration; political and social factors also play an important role. Meyer (2001) discusses how migrants, once established in a foreign country, often think they are not well paid but instead place greater value on other elements such as relational aspects or job satisfaction and interest. Politics are also an important part of migration and the possible reasons for migration.

Long distance migration is usually motivated by politics or economics (Cohen, 1995). Attention is drawn to the plight of political refugees daily; “internationally a great deal of contemporary migration is related to aspects of the political arena; the most well known politically-motivated migration is the flight from oppression and persecution, or political turmoil and instability” (Crush, 2000: 29).

Policy also plays an important role when discussing reasons for migration. There is again a great deal in the literature dealing with this aspect of migration as demonstrated by Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (2003) or Bernstein and Weiner (1999), but it is important to note the distinction between the highly skilled and the less highly skilled in this arena more than most; “however, the impact of political factors on skilled people may take different forms. Due to their higher mobility, skilled people may have a lower threshold of sensitivity and thus react not only to oppressive government, but also to unsatisfactory or disagreeable government and policies” (Crush, 2000: 29).

## **2.2 Return Migration**

There have been opinions that there exists little on the subject of return migration; “before the 1960s the literature on migration made little or no reference to the phenomenon of return migration. If return migration was mentioned it was only to lament that so little material existed upon it” (King, 1986: 1). Obviously times change, but still there is little on certain subgroups of return migration, and there remains some discourse as to the lack of information within the literature on these groups; “return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration” (Olesen, 2002: 135).

Paraphrasing Ghosh (2000a), Olesen is able to draw attention to the problem of return migration studies. Much has been made of transnationalism, forced migration and the creation of refugees in the literature. This is a situation that is altering, but what literature there is on return migration concentrates on the economic and social costs of

migrants returning to their country of origin (Byron and Condon, 1996), or concentrates on the policy decisions that either facilitate or impair this movement (Lawless, 1986). Within the literature the subjects of migration preferences and migrant intentions are often overlooked.

Portions of the information are concerned with the importance of understanding the different types of return migrant; “the phenomenon of return migration will have a differential impact depending on who returns” (Joly, 2000: 36). This comment was primarily directed at refugee studies, but could also be used in order to look at the migration of South Africans and Antipodeans, particularly the former in relation to the brain drain.

When looking at return migration there are a number of possible motives that migrants may ascribe to when considering migration back to their country of origins, as proposed by Cerase (1974) and paraphrased below;

Cerase has established four categories of reason: (a) *return of failure*: migrants who could not find the job necessary to survive and send back remittances; (b) *return of conservatism*: migrants who realized early on that they couldn't thrive in a different culture away from family and friends; (c) *return of retirement*: many migrants, after earning enough money, want to retire comfortably in the home country; (d) *return of innovation*

(Olesen, 2002: 137).

It is the final reason for return that is of interest to many since it provides information on the concept of brain gain. The return of innovation is where migrants return home voluntarily in order to seek a better life. However, in this study all are observed as possible reasons for migration and all are considered when evaluating migrants orientation towards their homeland.

This study expands upon the current state of the literature by focusing upon possible factors that govern the intentions of migrants considering a move home and the importance of policy decisions in assisting this movement. Some of the factors are discussed in the literature in general terms of migration but not specifically when looking at a sample group; “often the deciding factor will be the situation in the home country. If the economic outlook improves then returning will seem a more attractive proposition”<sup>1</sup> Many of the factors discussed within the existing literature are either politically or economically motivated, a situation illustrated by the previous and following quotations; “both savings and return decisions depend crucially on future income streams in the home and host country, which are in turn strongly affected by uncertainty” (Dustmann, 1997: 297). This study examines the impact of these factors, but also addresses other factors important to the discussion such as cultural and social reasons that affect migration intentions.

The condition of the current research on policy decisions is concerned with state intervention in the process of migration and return migration. In discussing policy decisions this paper suggests ways in which the governments in question are successful, or less so, in their policies and ways in which they can learn from one

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<sup>1</sup> [http://pstalker.com/migration/mg\\_emig\\_5.htm](http://pstalker.com/migration/mg_emig_5.htm)

another. Part of the research looks at how policy decisions, including return migration programmes and visa applications, impact upon the return migration process. In addition, policy decisions and the appropriateness of these decisions are discussed, continuing along similar themes as the Public Policy Institute of California; “if return migration is large and selective (that is, those who return are different from those who stay), policy makers run the risk of making policy decisions based on inaccurate data or faulty assumptions” (Reyes, 1997, vii).

Current work suggests that return migration can be reduced in the end to three factors; economic (Faist, 2000), political (Crush, 2000) or social (Gmelch & Richling, 1986; Byron and Condon, 1996). These reasons are the basis for return migration and the authors agree or disagree on these factors depending on the nationality and type of migrants that are returning.

The literature and the media suggest that there will be a difference between the South African return migration compared with the Antipodean return migration when suggesting possible reasons for the process. This is due to the political situation in South Africa (Crush, 2000) a situation that is discussed widely in *Carte Blanche*, a website of the South African television programme concerned with ‘investigative journalism and actuality reporting’.

### **2.3 Networks**

Transnationalism, globalisation and as a result migration are three phenomena that are all inherently global, and inherently reliant on networks. Much of the literature

concentrates on network analysis (Castells, 2000; Cohen, 1997) and world systems approaches to geography (Wallerstein, 1974). In this discussion it is acknowledged that networks and the idea of a world system are important, but to what extent do they affect the intentions that govern return migration. At the simplest level, “people tend to move not individually, but in groups” (Castles & Miller, 2003: 5).

Networks perform a number of different functions and therefore have a number of different effects on migration; “network patterns of ties comprise social, economic, political networks of interaction, as well as collectives such as groups – kinship groups or communities – and private or public associations” (Faist, 2000: 52). There is also literature detailing the reliance of migrants on these networks; “it is therefore important to understand the dependence of individuals on their social networks for accomplishing migration” (Grieco, 1995: 189).

However, what has not been documented is the reliance on these networks when considering return migration. Within this survey there are sections that aim to analyse the reliance on networks of both family and friends when considering return migration and whether or not they have any effect on their intentions to migrate. Faist (2000) mentions the importance of networks in order to accomplish migration but omits mention of the importance of networks when considering return migration, a situation that is dealt with in part by Choldin (1973) and Hannerz (1996).

The networks that the migrants use, and the positions that they hold when migrating to the UK from the three countries of origin generate the notion of invisible migrants a subject on which there is little in the literature. The term is used since they are of little

interest to the host nation as they cause little or no strain on the social security functions of the nation.

## **2.4 Highly Skilled Migration**

Invisible migration is possible because there are no perceived disadvantages to either country; “in most advanced economies there is a significant level of international migration which goes unnoticed. It is not noticed because it poses no threat in terms of perceived social and economic burdens for the sender and host societies” (Findlay, 1995: 515). The invisible migrants are often seen as a beneficial aspect of migration and as a result; “EU governments have been changing immigration legislation to make it easier to attract highly skilled labour” (Mahroum, 2001: 31).

In 2002 the UK Home Office changed part of their immigration policy in order to attract highly skilled labour as above. A new type of visa called the Highly Skilled Migration Programme (HSMP) was set up; “Since 28 January 2002, the Highly Skilled Migration Programme has provided talented people with exceptional skills, the opportunity to come to the United Kingdom to seek work. The United Kingdom Government operates a programme to allow individuals to seek entry, to work in the United Kingdom without having a prior offer of employment”<sup>2</sup> This works using a points system according to migrants education level and attained salary prior to migration and if successful, migrants are allowed to migrate to Britain without a job offer in order to seek work, a situation that would otherwise be impossible.

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<sup>2</sup> [http://www.migrationexpert.com/uk/skilled\\_migration.asp](http://www.migrationexpert.com/uk/skilled_migration.asp)

The visa was aimed at getting an increase in the number of skilled migrants, a situation that had previously been hampered by the preceding policy which placed strict rules upon immigrants in skilled employment in case they were to take the jobs of British workers; “a work permit is only issued by the British Department for employment if it considers that no suitable resident labour exists to fill a particular post” (Findlay, 1995: 517). Whilst workers from the EU could move freely and take jobs in the UK, skilled migrants from outside the EU such as those within this study were not able to do so. However, as this is no longer the case, there should be an increase in the next few years of both migrants of this type and literature that comments upon the process, but since it is a new piece of legislation put into permanent operation only in 2003 there is not a great quantity of literature on the subject as yet. There is little in the literature on this subject concerning migrants from the three countries since it is not a pressing issue and there is little motivation to investigate.

Invisible migrants are called invisible since they pose no threat to sender or host societies, the exception to this is the South African ‘Brain Drain’ which presents a clear threat to the sender society, it is estimated that for every skilled worker entering the country, ten have left (de Chaud, 2001). Whilst there is no problem for the UK in receiving such migrants, the loss of skilled workers to South Africa is a serious problem. At a time when the country is struggling to redevelop, to lose a large quantity of teachers, doctors and nurses creates large difficulties (Adepoju, 2003). Meyer (2001) describes the brain drain view as a substantialist viewpoint that regards skills as a ‘stock of knowledge and/or abilities embedded in the individual’. However, if the government of the sending country is able to develop a good return migration

policy and remain in contact with the migrant diaspora then the brain drain situation may not be too bad; “migration is rarely only one way. More often than not, the dream or conscious intention of a migrant is to return to the home country after a shorter or longer period of time abroad” (Olesen, 2002: 136).

When considering the brain drain it is also important to contemplate where the skills were developed, if a migrant leaves and develops skills whilst living outside the country of origin is it still a brain drain? Many of the students are part of this phenomenon since they migrate to the UK in order to continue education and as a result of the skills that are learnt whilst they are there they are then classified as part of the brain drain; “meanwhile, data on these skilled individuals are retrospective; their presence in a foreign country is counted as part of the brain drain, ignoring when and where their skills have been developed” (Meyer, 2001: 92). In order to try and stem the flow of graduates out of the UK the government altered its policy; “furthermore, non-EU students graduating from British universities may now stay if they can find a job” (Mahroum, 2001: 32).

This is therefore likely to decrease rates of return of the brain drain and therefore accentuate the problem. However, Meyer (2001) draws attention to the pragmatic viewpoint such that it is difficult to attract skilled migrants back since they have settled abroad in better economic conditions than the country of origin would ever be able to provide them with and therefore it is unrealistic to generate programmes of return migration; “however, they may still be interested in their country of origin; let’s then try to connect them with it and benefit not only from their individual embedded

knowledge, but also from extensive socio-professional network that they have built abroad” (Meyer, 2001: 97).

## **2.5 Historical Ties Between the Countries**

The final section of the literature pertains to the possible historical ties between the three countries that could suggest reasons for the ease of migration between them. There are historical ties in terms of culture, language and familial ties, but there are also those that are more formal; “in the case of European immigration, countries such as France, the Netherlands, and the UK, most movers come from former colonies” (Faist, 2000: 51), a situation also expanded upon by Byron and Condon (1996) when discussing the labour sources of colonial lands. These ties are important when considering policy implications such as visas and therefore are important when considering return migration as well.

## **2.6 Summary**

Upon examination of the current literature the following becomes clear:

- Highly skilled migration is a phenomenon that is on the increase;
- The nature of the highly skilled migration varies according to sender and host countries;
- Return migration of highly skilled migrants can broadly be divided into three categories: economic return, political return and social return.

This study was aimed at filling in the gap in the literature that looks at the intentions that govern return migration and how this affects their perception of homeland. This generates the aims of the study:

- Is the migration related to age, gender, or education? Does the migration reflect the different characteristics of the sample?
- What is the historical significance of the three countries to the UK in relation to migration? Why do their citizens migrate to the UK?
- Are there different priorities for each group when considering migration? How are the different groups orientated towards their homelands
- All three governments are interested in migrants returning, what would make the migrants return?

In order to move onto the methodology a brief explanation of why the three countries were chosen is necessary. The study aimed to look at return migration of skilled migrants from the UK. Countries were chosen that had links with UK so the ties to the UK would facilitate movement between the countries. All had English as the primary national language since it would have complicated the research in order to translate the questionnaires. All were economically developed.

All are Commonwealth countries and are established members, South Africa joined in 1910 as a Sovereign Republic, whilst Australia and New Zealand joined in 1931 as Sovereign Constitutional Monarchies. This ruled out choosing migrants from the USA as they are not a Commonwealth country. All have English as an official language, this rules out France. All three countries are economically developed this rules out the inclusion of the Caribbean migrants. These decisions to include or exclude countries

were necessary in order to target a specific group of people for the study in order to gain focused results. However, under these parameters Canada can still be included. The decision was made to exclude Canada since it would make the study too broad. The countries were such that there were many similarities between them. This was done in the hope that there were fewer variables than between countries that were largely different.

## **Methodology**

The research is structured using the following research questions as points of discussion;

- Is the migration related to age, gender, or education? Does the migration reflect the different characteristics of the sample?
- What is the historical significance of the three countries to the UK in relation to migration? Why do their citizens migrate to the UK?
- Given all migrants expressed a desire to return, are there different priorities for each group when considering migration? How are the different groups orientated towards their homelands
- All three governments are interested in migrants returning, what would make the migrants return?

In order to gather information for this discussion three different methods were used. An online survey and several key informant interviews were used to collect information questioning the reasons why Australians, South Africans and New

Zealanders who live in the United Kingdom choose to return home. This was supplemented by census data from the 2001 census.<sup>1</sup>

### **3.1 Questionnaires**

The questionnaire was posted online, consisted of nineteen questions with space for supplementary information and took less than ten minutes to complete. A pilot survey was undertaken in order to check the effectiveness of the questionnaire and the practical issues that might arise. Kneale (2003) draws attention to the need for a pilot survey in order to ‘explore the possibility of other angles’. A copy of the questionnaire can be seen in the appendices.

Ten questionnaires were sent to people from the three countries who were living in Oxford. They filled in the questionnaire as well as providing some feedback. As a result several of the questions were deleted with a number being altered. Instead of having a number of tick boxes for nationality, people were asked to describe their own nationality, thus observing how they viewed themselves. To question 8, the two factors of climate and culture were added in addition to the ten factors that were already listed. To question 12, in addition to the twelve factors in the pilot study, climate, culture and government programmes for return migration were added. Finally a yes/no answer was deleted from section four of the survey since it was superfluous with the additions to questions 8 and 12.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/default.asp>

Online questionnaires were chosen as a method of data collection since they were able to reach a community that was otherwise difficult to get hold of in large numbers in order to create a sampling frame. It was reasoned that an online method was fast and was cheaper than postal mail, faxes and phone. Due to the set up of the programme responses could be received any time of day and automatically loaded into a spreadsheet (Madge and O'Connor, 2001).

A snowball sampling method was used and in order to start the survey I emailed a number of personal contacts from the three groups asking them to fill in the survey and then pass the link onto their friends. Using a proactive method was necessary since “there is little point in having a web page and setting up an online survey and passively ‘waiting’ for eligible respondents to find the site: more active enrolment is needed to encourage users to complete an online survey” (Madge & O'Connor, 2001: 94).

Using snowball sampling, especially in relation to an Internet survey has implications in terms of bias and accuracy that will be discussed later in this section. As well as using personal contacts for snowball sampling, I also placed links on message boards on NGO websites aimed at members of the three groups, one provided by Southern Cross Group ([www.southern-cross-group.org](http://www.southern-cross-group.org)) and one provided by Double Zero 27 ([www.doublezero27.com](http://www.doublezero27.com)). In addition to this, Southern Cross Group, Double Zero 27 and OUANZ (Oxford University Australia and New Zealand Society) sent out e-bulletins letting their members know about my survey. I attempted to contact SASIO (South Africa Society in Oxford) but the web page could not be found. The High Commission of each country was also contacted through general channels and no

response was received from any of them. However, a member of the New Zealand High Commission replied having received the e-bulletin from the Southern Cross Group and offered general advice without being able to help directly.

An ideal survey is randomly drawn from the population. However in this case it was not possible since there is no central list of the groups in the UK and as a result a random sampling frame cannot be generated (Madge & O'Connor, 2001), similar problems exist for systematic and stratified sampling (Robinson, 1998). As a result of these problems, and of the nature of an Internet survey a snowball sampling method was chosen. It must be noted that there are limitations; snowball sampling introduces a bias to the discussion since the data is collected from a group of people who are linked or are alike and therefore runs the risk of missing those individuals who are not so integrated into the economic, political cultural or social networks.

As well as a bias being introduced by not being able to randomly sample, it was not possible to alter the survey to stop the bias due to the online nature. It was accepted that this was the only way that access to the groups could be gained efficiently and therefore the survey proceeded, taking measures to decrease the bias as much as possible. However, even with a large number of the population being computer literate and having access to the internet it must be recognized that although there are benefits from using the Internet as a sample frame it is also the case that there exist many of the same problems with the research as exist in conventional surveys; “many of the issues and problems of conventional research methods still apply in the virtual venue” (Madge & O'Connor, 2001: 100).

The final problem when trying to justify accuracy and a representative sample lies in the use of the Internet itself. Since there is no way of ascertaining the identity of anyone who uses the Internet it means that people are not necessarily whom they say they are. This is known as 'spoofing', purposefully filling in questionnaires falsely whilst pretending to be someone else. However, the methods used to get volunteers for the survey are through reputable organizations, which would suggest that any spoofing is unlikely.

When the survey finished the college computing officer used a programme to decode all of the responses into an excel spreadsheet to facilitate analysis. During the eight weeks that the web page was active it received a total of 331 responses. However, after sifting through the data only 312 were fully completed and capable of statistical tests being performed on them. This was a far greater number than was expected and the strength of the conclusions lies in the size of the sample, 312 respondents in total. Each group had greater than 30 respondents thus ensuring a minimum number for testing independently of one another (Ebdon, 1985). The statistical part of the dissertation used a combination of Microsoft Excel and statistics and graphic program, Autograph 2.10.

### **3.3 Semi-structured interviews**

The second method of data collection used semi-structured interviews in order to gain a more detailed perception of migration and generate qualitative data. An outline of basic questions was set up and used as a starting point to aid further discussion in a series of face-to-face interviews. It was hoped that they would generate other

questions as the conversation naturally progressed, and in all cases they were successful in doing so.

The interviews were scheduled to last between thirty and forty-five minutes and all but one lasted a little over an hour. The respondents of the interviews were self selected, a link was provided at the bottom of the questionnaire stating that if they wished to contribute to the research in a more in depth manner they could get in contact through email. There were only four respondents; a magazine section editor for TNT (magazine for Australians in London), a strategy planner for South African Brewers (SAB), a city lawyer and the head of the Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants in the UK Group. All interviewees expressed a personal interest in the subject, as well as a business interest, and were in positions that provided different depths of information about the communities in question.

The interviews provided a qualitative element to the subject material, rather than simply dealing with the more quantitative data gathered by questionnaire. Whilst it would have been preferable to have a large number of interviews the self-selecting method only generated four responses.

## **Results and Discussion**

The results of the questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews are discussed within this section with reference to the research questions. Data from the questionnaires, individual responses and quotations from the interviews are all combined to build up a picture of migration from the three countries and answer the following research questions:

- Is the migration related to age, gender, or education? Does the migration reflect the different characteristics of the sample?
- What is the historical significance of the three countries to the UK in relation to migration? Why do their citizens migrate to the UK?
- Given that all migrants expressed an interest to return, are there different priorities for each group when considering migration? How are the different groups orientated towards their homelands
- All three governments are interested in migrants returning, what would make the migrants return?

## 4.1 Migration and the characteristics of migrants

- Is the migration related to age, gender, or education? Does the migration reflect the different characteristics of the sample?

### 4.11 *Migration and Gender*

The questionnaire data gave the following figures for composition of the sample. 145 respondents (46.5%) reported themselves as male and 167 respondents (53.5%) reported themselves as female. This was split further into nationalities and a chi-squared contingency table was used in order to ascertain whether there was any link between sex and nationality. At the 95% level there was no association between sex and nationality, therefore people of a particular sex are no more likely to migrate if they are from a particular nationality, and the migration of a particular nationality is not governed by their sex. It can be argued that the results support the contention of Castles and Miller (2003) that women are playing a more important role in contemporary migration, but it is equally important to note that the calculation shows that this survey has no bias by gender, a situation commensurate with the 2001 Census. The census data shows that the gender balance of international migrants in 2001 was 51.2% male, 48.8% female, though at the time of writing the individual figures for South Africa, Australia and New Zealand were not published.

Observations can also be made by looking at the numbers of male and female migrants with spouse visas; of the 21 migrants with spouse visas 38% were male and

62% female, figures that are closer to an even split than might otherwise be expected if the 'trailing spouse phenomenon' existed in this situation.

When education levels of the migrants with spouse visas, and their priorities when migrating to Britain supplement this information, it is clear that most are not trailing spouses. Just under half of females (38.5%) said that their partner was not important in their decision to migrate to the UK. This is a situation vastly different to that of the men in the survey, 62.5% of whom rated their partner as being very important when considering migration. When asked to rate the importance of a partner in their decision to migrate to the UK the figure was 1.5 with 1 rated as a very important factor and 5 rated as having no importance, this was much higher than the 2.9 from women with spouse visas. Of the thirteen women with spouse visas, 11 had bachelor degrees and all of these women found the job opportunities in the UK better than in their country of origin. This suggests that they are not trailing spouses, but independent migrants.

#### 4.12 Migration and age




Figure 1: Chart illustrating the age of migrants.

Using the age in conjunction with the visa type 41% of the migrants between 18 and 26 were here either on a student visa or on a working holiday visa supporting the hypothesis that the younger migrants within the sample are more likely to be in the UK either for the purposes of travel or on a working. In addition to this all the working holiday and student visas<sup>1</sup> were issued to migrants between the ages of 18-35<sup>2</sup> suggesting younger people are more likely to migrate for holidays or study than older people. This can be linked to the time abroad that the Australians and New

<sup>1</sup> Working holiday visas are granted to migrants between 17 and 30 years old inclusive whilst student visas have no age limitations.

<sup>2</sup> The only exception to this is respondent 107 whose age is given in the 56+ age bracket and documentation is given as a working holiday visa suggesting that one answer, either age or documentation was filled in incorrectly.

Zealanders call the Overseas Experience (OE) a similar concept to the gap year that is almost seen as a rite of passage. This is supported by some of the qualitative answers given to question 8. Respondents had the option to fill in other factors when considering their migration to the UK and example responses were; “opportunity to travel” (respondent 032); “new experience, close for travel to Europe” (respondent 038) and “the experience of living overseas” (respondent 263).

In addition to young migrants being more likely to be in the UK for travel, study or low skilled work, it can also be observed that people differ as to whether they consider age an important factor in migration according to their age themselves. The numbers who consider age an important factor in migration increases with each group apart from the last one where a slight dip is observed. The figure rises from 31% considering age an important factor in migration amongst 18-25 year olds to 39% amongst 26-35 year olds, to 48% amongst 36-45 year olds, 73% amongst 46-55 year olds and 60% amongst those older than 55.

#### *4.13 Migration and Education*

The majority of these migrants are highly educated; 83% have bachelor degrees. However, when this is combined with the types of visa that people have it is interesting to note that of the South Africans with bachelor degrees only 5.9% have working holiday visas whereas of the Antipodeans with bachelor degrees 11.5% have working holiday visas, see table 1.

<b>Nationality</b> <b>Visa type</b>	<b>Australians</b>	<b>New Zealanders</b>	<b>South Africans</b>
EU Passport	43	18	21
Ancestral Visa	43	24	14
Working Holiday	21	13	3
Sponsorship Visa	37	5	5
Spouse Visa	13	6	2
Residency Permit	12	3	2
Indefinite Leave to Remain	8	3	2
Student	5	3	2
Same Partner Spouse Visa	1	0	0
Diplomatic Visa	1	0	0
Specific Visa	0	1	0
Highly Skilled Migration Program	1	0	0

Table 1: Table illustrating the breakdown of the survey by nationality and visa type.

This suggests that Antipodeans are in the UK merely for travel and are working in low skilled jobs for the purposes of financing travel without many long term settlement aspirations, whereas the South Africans have a lower quantity of people on the working holiday visas and therefore there are more people who are able to do jobs that are career enhancing. However, those with EU passports or ancestral visas are

allowed to work in career enhancing jobs anyway and therefore further data could be collected on this subject to confirm or deny this assertion. This is reflected in the importance of jobs as a factor in motivating them to migrate to the UK; 51% of South Africans cited job opportunity as a very important factor (1 or 2) on the scale on question 8 whereas the same figure was only 48% for Antipodeans.

## **4.2 Historical Significance of the three countries and the UK**

- What is the historical significance of the three countries to the UK in relation to migration? Why do their citizens migrate to the UK?

When looking migrants from the three countries in Britain it is pertinent to ask why they come to Britain in the first place? What factors make them choose Britain over other countries either Commonwealth or otherwise? This section investigates the historical links between Britain and the three countries looking at how they relate to one another in terms of cultural and familial links, political links and policy facilitating access.

### *4.21 Historical significance*

The historical significance of the three countries is instantly clear displayed by their membership of the Commonwealth. Being a part of this has had uses in areas such as trade and political support, but also in migration. The parallels between these countries facilitate movement; the classic example of which being education. Iredale (2001) draws attention to the historical pattern of common training systems, this being

most notable in medicine. The similarities of the course enables movement of students/training fellows between institutions/hospitals and makes possible common standards for automatic registration of practitioners from anywhere in the Commonwealth. Therefore if training has occurred in a Commonwealth country the migrant is seen as sufficiently qualified due to the likeness of one course to another.

#### *4.22 Cultural and familial links*

The status of the three countries as Commonwealth countries provides a host of cultural similarities that are important when considering the migration to and from Britain. The language barrier is not a problem since all are likely to speak English; they are employable because of their comparative education systems and are more likely to be able to secure a visa due to the relationship between Britain and the three countries as well as the high possibility of having an EU passport or ancestral visa already. This point is supported by James Moeskops (interviewee 4) when talking about transferability of skills he mentions that accountant's professional qualifications are transferable between Australia and the UK, it is also discussed within the literature; "similarities of the educational, occupational and cultural (especially linguistic) systems between this country and the rest of the Commonwealth prepare the way for an expanded employability of persons and the transportability of their skills" (Meyer, 2001: 99).

Data collected from question 11, looking at why migrants who had investigated migrating to another country chose the UK, supports the ideas that factors such as culture, language, ability to secure a visa and access to the job market are important

issues in considering whether historical links are important in the migration process of the three countries to and from the UK. Various responses provide evidence that language is an important cultural barrier that in this case does not have to be navigated thus facilitating migration when asked question 11 people responded; “visa and language” (respondent 024); “English speaking. Good job market. Open job market to foreigners. The positive experience had by others. Access to Europe. Money comes into it, but not that strong a decision making point. Different opportunities from those in Australia. I have a British passport” (respondent 146); “English speaking and I have a couple of relatives here, if I ever needed some help (financially, probably!!)” (respondent 032).

The quotations demonstrate language as an important cultural factor and one that in this case does not exist, thus making migration easier. However, this does not mean that the language factor is UK specific, the migrants would also have not language barrier in any English speaking country such as the USA or Canada, what differentiates the UK from these two countries are the familial contacts that many of the South African, Australian and New Zealand migrants retain with the UK which they do not have with the USA and Canada as they were not the centre of empires to which the three countries belonged.

The latter two quotations also develop the argument of familial connections. As the respondents observed, many migrants either have family in the country already, or their ancestors were from the UK. This provides a direct advantage over many migrants since they do not have to obtain visas. Data from the questionnaire supports this proposition as 52% of the migrants are EU passport holders or have ancestral

visas. When this figure is split by nationality 69% of South Africans have EU passports or ancestral visas, 55% of New Zealanders and 46% of Australians; generating another reason why South Africans are more likely to stay in Britain than the other two groups.

In addition to this, many of the migrants cited family reasons as influencing their decision to migrate to the UK in the first place, giving some idea of the consistency of familial influences on migration; “proximity to Europe, family living here” (respondent 044); “family live here and do not have to apply for a visa” (respondent 062). Therefore the influence of familial networks is not to be underplayed. This factor is combined with the ability to find work in the UK because of the historical links in terms of education and visas meaning that the UK becomes an attractive destination.

#### *4.23 Policy*

There are historical links between the three countries that continue to develop in contemporary times. This is illustrated by eligibility of the migrants to remain and work in the UK if they have an EU passport or ancestral visa; the HSMP developed in the last couple of years to facilitate movement between the UK and the three countries even if the migrant has no British ancestors.

This is a situation that is becoming more common in Western Europe as the competition for skilled migrants increases; “increasing globalization and the competition for skilled human resources has put the spotlight on skills shortages”

(Iredale, 2001: 20). As the competition intensifies so policies change to reflect this and provide favourable conditions for everyone, not just the three countries within this survey; “against this background, EU governments have been changing immigration legislation to make it easier to attract highly skilled labour” (Mahroum, 2001: 31). Thus policies change to reflect the necessary influx of skilled labour, a situation from which the South Africans, Australians and New Zealanders can only stand to benefit. Not only do they have the historical links between the countries and the easier access to visas if they have had British ancestors, but now with new policies, even those who do not have British ancestors are not disadvantaged; “furthermore, non-EU students graduating from British universities may now stay if they can find a job” (Mahroum, 2001: 32).

#### **4.3 Priorities when considering migration and orientation towards homeland**

- Given that all the migrants expressed an interest to return, are there different priorities for each group when considering migration? How are the different groups orientated towards their homelands?

This section uses the data from questionnaires and interviews to answer the research questions; are there different priorities for each group when considering return migration? How are the different groups oriented towards their homelands? The section is divided into migration to Britain, a brief summary of factors that migrants rate as important followed by a summary of the three countries and how their perceptions of factors governing return migration generate ideas as to their orientation when considering return migration, hence their orientation towards their homelands.

#### 4.31 Migration to Britain

All three groups have similar priorities. For migration to Britain all three groups rate job opportunities in the UK, the UK economic situation and culture as strong reasons for migrating to Britain. South Africans also cite politics in South Africa as an important reason for their migration to Britain. This gives an initial idea about the South African orientation towards their homeland. Much of their migration is politically motivated, either for social reasons directly due to political policy, or economic reasons as a result of the economic instability that is present in the region. This differs from the Antipodeans' perspective as there are greater incentives to remain in Britain rather than return. One South African comments; "violent crime was a major factor in prompting me to migrate" (respondent 288).

#### 4.32 Summary of factors

Question 12 gained information as to the importance that migrants from each of the three countries attached to different factors that might cause migration. All three countries rated the factors of family, living standards, climate and culture in their country of origin as important factors when considering the possibility of return migration.

	Climate	Family	Living Standards	Culture
<b>Australian Average</b>	2.12	2.25	2.30	2.68
<b>New Zealand Average</b>	2.28	2.11	2.24	2.80
<b>South African Average</b>	2.12	2.45	2.25	2.63
<b>Survey Average</b>	2.16	2.25	2.28	2.70

Table 2: Table illustrating the factors which respondents rated as most important.

The average values for each factor 2.16 for climate, 2.25 for family, 2.28 for living standards, 2.70 for culture (1 is very important and 5 is not important). This is followed by looking at the factors in terms of relative importance between the countries allowing national priorities concerning migration to be established.

#### *4.33 Australian Migration Priorities and Homeland Orientation*

The intentions that govern Australian migration in this case are for the most part economically minded, as illustrated by their values for job opportunities in the UK and the economic situation in the UK, 2.71 and 3.38 respectively. Whilst the latter of these values is higher than one would expect, it was rated as only slightly important, the reason the figure is used is because it is one that the Australians rate as more important than the other two nationalities. The Australian migrants would also ascribe little importance to government programmes aimed at return migration. This supports the contention that Australian migrants are in the UK either to work for a few years and save money to ensure an elevated standard of living when they return home, or to earn a little money to travel. These reflect the views of the highly skilled migrants, and the migrants who come over on the working holiday visas. Data to support the hypothesis that Australians are primarily concerned with travel rather than political or economic factors is taken from The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Australia (UK Branch) who conducted a survey in June 2003 finding that 46.9% of members of the ICAA came to the UK for the primary reason of travel.

#### *4.34 New Zealand Migration Priorities and Homeland Orientation*

The New Zealand migrants within the survey rated social factors as more important than the economic or political options with which they were presented. Priorities for the New Zealand group when considering migration were family (2.11) followed by living standards (2.24) and then friends (3.28), with no significant difference between the New Zealand men and women within the survey.

This reflects the notion that New Zealanders in Britain have less interest in the socio-economic factors since they have little effect on the migrants as they are largely doing un-skilled and semi-skilled jobs in order to travel. Other factors considered when migrating to Britain illustrate this, with 29% of migrants from New Zealand independently writing that travel was an important part of their migration to Britain.

The lack of importance that New Zealanders attach to many of the economic and political factors within Britain and considering migration home gives a clear indication that they are not concerned with remaining in Britain permanently or for any extended durations like the South Africans, nor are they interested in securing a better standard of living for when they return home, instead, travel is the primary focus.

#### *4.35 South African Migration Priorities and Homeland Orientation*

South African priorities when considering return migration are both politically and economically motivated with considerable overlap between the two areas. The South

African part of the sample thought that lack of jobs at home, instability in the South African economy, home politics and government programs were all important thoughts when considering return migration.

The South Africans rated the factors of home economic situation (2.53) and home political situation (2.67) far more important than their Australian and New Zealand counterparts who gave values of 3.32, 4.02 and 3.57, 3.84 respectively. One possible explanation of this is that the South Africans, due to the political and economic changes that are taking place at home at the moment, feel a greater sense of civil duty or loyalty to their country. Development is visibly happening and they feel that they would like to be a part. Non-profit NGO Websites, such as homecoming revolution, try to promote a sense of being a part of the development of the 'new' South Africa and hope that migrants want to be a part of this.

When looking at factors that are least important to South Africans when considering migration reference must be made to the visa issue; South Africans rate visa issues as not important (4.12) when considering return migration. This figure places much less emphasis on the importance of visas when considering return migration than the other two countries, Australians give a value of 3.82 whilst New Zealanders give the highest importance rating of the three countries at 3.68, begging the question why do South Africans not consider visas as important as the other two countries when considering return migration? One possibility is that South Africans do not think about visa problems since a large number of them already have an EU passport or ancestral visa due to family connections, a situation supported by the statistic that 69% of South Africans have EU passports or ancestral visas.

#### **4.4 What would make migrants return?**

- All three governments are interested in migrants returning; what would make the migrants return?

The focus within this section revisits the problem of intentions and how governments are able to affect them. All three governments are interested in assisting in return migration in order to negate the effects of the ‘Brain Drain’ and the results show possible ways in which this is possible.

Within this section problems with current policy are discussed and possible incentives and solutions are suggested. Current policy is flawed for different reasons for each country. Therefore the section is divided into four parts; problems with South African Policy; problems with Australian Policy; problems with policy in New Zealand and finally possible changes to policy from a migrant standpoint are suggested using data gathered on migrant intentions.

##### *4.41 Problems with policy in South Africa*

Currently South Africa is experiencing problems with the Brain Drain (Crush, 2000). However, little is being done to rectify the situation. In interviews with South Africans there was a general feeling of mistrust of the South African government (Nicola Jowell, interviewee 2) or at least a feeling that some of the policies that they had adopted towards South African expatriates were not particularly favourable (Chris Black, interviewee 3). Examples of policies show reasons for initial emigration and

continuing to remain abroad. A policy of making all new doctors do two years bush medicine after qualification, drove a large proportion of the workforce to the UK and elsewhere in order to seek higher salaries and a different type of employment.

The final problems with South African's return migration at the moment are crime and an unstable economic situation. A large number within the survey cited crime as a major concern and if the government was able to do something to reduce crime they would happily move back home. This response was also coupled with a wariness of South Africa's economic situation; "many South Africans are reticent to invest back in South Africa until the economic shows more signs of stabilizing" (Nicola Jowell, interviewee 2).

However, having illustrated the negative points, the South Africans did have the most positive response to the government return migration programmes rating them at 3.84. This is significantly more important than the Australian and New Zealand averages of 4.22 and 4.28 suggesting that despite the problems, South Africans are willing to return migrate in order to have an influence in their home political and social situation.

#### *4.42 Problems with policy in Australia*

The Australians were apathetic about government programmes for return migration rating it on average the lowest of all factors when considering return migration. Many Australians had not heard of any policies that were influenced by the government aiding return migration. However, this is not such a large problem as the South

African brain drain as there is greater governmental communication to migrants in the Australian diaspora in the hope that it will increase the possibilities of return migration.

This is adequately demonstrated by the current investigation into ‘all aspects of the Australian diaspora’ by the Australian Senate’s Legal and Constitutional References Committee, a situation that has been prompted by lobbying from the Southern Cross Group. The situation of highly skilled migration is no longer always seen as a problem; instead there are positive aspects to focus on as well; “some good may come out of this expatriation in terms of increasing access to external resources...emphasis is placed on science and technology as well as educational policies that could provide incentives and conditions for effective returns” (Meyer, 2001: 104). Therefore the Australian diaspora is more likely to return of its own accord rather than having any kind of forcing from governmental policies. In the mean time the all the government has to do is to remain in touch with those migrants through the use of NGOs such as Southern Cross Group.

#### *4.43 Problems with policy in New Zealand*

Migration from New Zealand, like Australia is not a pressing problem; whilst there is a ‘Brain Drain’ effect, it is not as large as that which exists in South Africa (Rawlinson & Benson-Rea, 2003), nor does it have the same temporal problems as well as spatial ones. The migrants frequently return to New Zealand, a situation that does not occur so frequently in South Africa (Stalker, 2001). However, the New Zealand migrants do have the lowest importance ascribed to government programmes

for return migration from the three countries, and therefore whilst return migration is not a problem at the moment due to the socio-economic factors which mean the migrants keep returning, it is something to consider when making future policy decisions.

#### *4.44 Aiding return migration: possible solutions*

What possible solutions can therefore be suggested to encourage expatriates home? What policy decisions can have a positive impact, thus creating a brain gain scenario? In the case of all three countries there needs to be an increased network of communications through organizations such as SANSA, Southern Cross Group and similar NGOs. By remaining in contact there is the possibility of utilizing the skills and contacts that the migrants have built up abroad (Meyer, 2001).

As well as remaining in contact with the migrants there are also policies that the government could develop in order to offer incentives for return migration such as tax relief on business start up, grants to cover the cost of travel expenses et cetera. There could also be other economically attractive possibilities that might appeal to the migrants within the survey since 53% of them thought home economy was very important or important. The final problem is one on which government policy can only have a limited effect and that is the notion of migrants feeling ostracized at home for leaving. By providing government programmes for return migration there might not be so much negativity.

## **Conclusions**

The conclusions are discussed in relation to the initial research questions; how do the main findings relate to the research questions. Knowing what the governments are doing, how effective or appropriate are the policies? What could the governments learn from one another, what policies ought they to adopt? This dissertation examines return migration and how migrants are orientated towards their homelands. Several recurring themes are apparent; the Antipodean migrants are very similar in their migration preferences whilst the South Africans, who share a number of the preferences that the antipodeans exhibit, approach return migration with a slightly different perspective. Following this the success of internet as a medium for research is discussed.

### **5.1 Research questions**

- Is the migration related to age, gender, or education? Does the migration reflect the different characteristics of the sample?

The main findings within this section show that migration is not related to age, gender, education or nationality. However, people's perceptions do change according to their characteristics so whilst the factors above do not mean that people are more or less likely to migrate, they do show that the reasons that different groups migrate can be very different.

In terms of differences between the sexes, there are a greater proportion of women within the survey. However, these are not part of the trailing spouse phenomenon, the majority are well educated and have good job prospects in the UK. Of those who have spouse visas there is only a slight female majority and of those 13 women, 11 had bachelor degrees and cited good job prospects as an important factor in their migration.

Age and nationality are not linked when considering migration; members of one country are no more likely to migrate than any other simply because they are within a certain age group. However, the type of migration is likely to differ, the younger migrants were more disposed to short term migration that did not utilize their skills, instead treating their migration as an extended gap year. The older migrants tended to be more established and were migrating in order to further their career or raise families. In addition to this it was discovered that people's decision to migrate, their inertia, was dictated by age. The older the migrant, the less well disposed towards migration.

A large number of migrants were well educated, with 83% having bachelor degrees or higher. The antipodeans were more likely to be in Britain to travel and work in low

skilled jobs reflecting their age and interest in the 'overseas experience' whereas South Africans were more likely to be involved in high skilled jobs.

- What is the historical significance of the three countries to the UK in relation to migration? Why do their citizens migrate to the UK?

The three countries have a number of similarities both with each other and with the UK that all directly affect their decisions to migrate. The similarities of the education and training systems play a major part in facilitating movement between the three countries and the UK (Iredale, 2001). The language is not a barrier and there are large numbers of all three groups in the UK which have created networks to facilitate migration to and from the UK. The familial links cannot be ignored either when considering migration to the UK or return migration.

- Are there different priorities for each group when considering migration? How are the different groups orientated towards their homelands

All three groups cite economic reasons as one of the dominant factors when considering their migration to Britain. However, when considering return migration the factors change slightly according to nationality. The South African population are more orientated towards their homeland in a political sense; South Africa is developing socially and politically, and the majority of South African expatriates expressed a wish to be a part of this change. The Australian population were more interested in economic effects on standard of living. By working in the UK for a few years many are able to return to Australia with a higher standard of living than they

would have otherwise been able to achieve. The New Zealand expatriates again expressed a slightly different orientation towards homeland, one that was more socially based. The New Zealand diaspora articulated a greater interest in social factors when considering return migration than the other two groups; their return migration was dictated by the actions and situations of their friends and family. To summarize then, South Africans are politically orientated, Australians are socially orientated, but have economic situation as a major priority as well, whilst New Zealanders are more socially orientated towards their homeland.

- All three governments are interested in migrants returning, what would make the migrants return?

The priorities for each of the groups are slightly different. The South Africans want to be a part of the development of South Africa, but there is a mistrust of the government and a fear about the social factors of crime, economic and social instability and the problem of aids. Therefore a more open government, with a stable economic and social situation would encourage people to return. By valuing the contribution that migrants can make the government has a greater chance of increasing return migration whereas many policies at the moment alienate and ostracize creating a feeling that the migrants are unwelcome.

The Antipodean diaspora is much more apathetic than the South African diaspora when considering return migration programmes. However, greater governmental communication is welcomed. The Antipodean diaspora are likely to return of their

own accord in their own time and therefore policies must be designed with the aim of keeping in touch with the migrants and not adopting any forcing policies.

## **5.2 How effective or appropriate are current policies?**

There are flaws in the current policies of all three governments. The flaws are outlined below and then possible changes are discussed in the final section.

South African migration policy debates have tended to focus on cross border labour migration and hence on men, women have long been seen as ‘those left behind’. This situation means that migration policy has been aimed at only a proportion of the migrants that leave South Africa. Migration has remained male dominated for the past decade but more women are becoming more common in migration and there has been an increase in women crossing borders in southern Africa, for example the increase in movement in the health sector is thought to be female dominated (Crush, 2000).

The Australian policies are similar to those of the South African government. There is little in the way of a formal policy on return migration, instead there are a number of agreements between states aimed at facilitating the return of migrants if they make the decision to return home. The most obvious one of these agreements is the bilateral social security agreement, the Australian agreement, before it was stopped, was the same as the South African in the respect that the pensions paid are not indexed to the cost of living in a particular country. Bilateral social security agreements are those that allow migrants to contribute to the social security of their host state in order to claim benefits later on either in Australia or their host country. However, the

Australian bilateral social security agreement with the UK was terminated on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2001. With the retirement of this policy it leads to problems for return migration since a migrant who has moved to a country where there is no bilateral agreement cannot claim a pension from that country and still live in Australia, this is a problem which is in the public view; “In our assessment, the current paucity of bilateral social security coverage for Australians overseas is one of the great hidden drawbacks of being globally mobile today” (Southern Cross Group).

The situation of bilateral social security arrangements is also made worse by the problems of dual citizenship. The Australian government did not allow dual citizenship under the Australian Citizenship Act 1948. However, section 17 has now been repealed and dual citizenship is seen as a positive aspect of international migration.

New Zealand policy differs slightly from the Australian policy in the respect that New Zealanders are allowed multiple citizenships and therefore the argument of forcing migrants to pledge allegiance to one country does not apply. However, New Zealand, like Australia does not have any formal programmes encouraging return migration and instead relies on NGO contact with the diaspora in order to maintain in contact and passively encourage return migration.

### **5.3 What can governments learn from one another?**

It would be presumptuous to suggest that a dissertation such as this could be the foundation of return migration policy, however there are things that can be

highlighted in the policy decisions of each government that other governments could learn from when considering return migration policy.

The focus South African government policy towards migration has been male biased in the past by looking simply at cross border labour migration. This situation is beginning to change with increased numbers of women moving for labour in various skill sectors, as well as the South African government looking into other types of migration, not just cross border labour migrations. It is also only just beginning to recognize the problems of the 'brain drain' a situation that is combated currently by academic and non-governmental organizations aimed at encouraging return migration such as home coming revolution, SANSA and SAMP. Therefore the Antipodean governments could take a note of the cooperation between organizations like SAMP and SANSA a situation that is beginning to happen with the development of and communication with NGOs such as Southern Cross Group.

The South African government should also be aware that there exists within the expatriate population a huge untapped resource. This is a situation that the Antipodean governments have been quick to recognize with the increased dialogue between the diaspora and state. The resource does not have to be within the country of origin for the home nation to take advantage. As this study has shown many migrants are keen to remain in touch with their home nation, indeed many are active in national organizations abroad.

Therefore it is important to acknowledge that expatriate communities can play as large a role abroad as they would at home and the only sensible course of action is to

develop policy that reflects this. In order to do so, policy should be developed along three lines with the following aims. Methods that may aid each of the objectives are outlined beneath each point;

1. To increase communication between the state and the diaspora
  - By increasing formal communication including development of a skills network, for example SANSA, social events at the High Commissions, more formal lines of communication in order to discuss expatriate issues and how the High Commissions are able to help formally and informally.
  - By increasing informal communication including discussion groups, online forums and use of NGOs to remain in contact and bring expatriate issues and news to the attention of the home population, for example Southern Cross Group.
  - By publishing all of the options available to migrants somewhere that they are able to access the information whether home or abroad.
  
2. To facilitate movement back to the home country
  - By allowing dual citizenship a return path is open to migrants, one that would not be possible if they had to give up their home citizenship. This is a situation where the Australian government has changed policy recently meaning that now all three countries allow dual citizenship.
  
3. To provide incentives for return migration
  - By giving new business start ups tax rebates and access to advice
  - By subsidizing travel for return migration

- By continuing the bilateral social security arrangements so people have the option to return home for retirement if they so desire.

All of these measures are not new ideas, they are ideas in existence that governments are using at the moment. Through this survey migrant preferences have been highlighted and would suggest that all of the above measures would yield positive results with varying degrees of success depending on the choice of policy.

#### **5.4 Is the internet successful as a medium for research?**

As well as discussing the results of the study, it is also important to focus on the success of the study in using the internet as a sampling frame. By obtaining a sample size of 312 the accuracy of the study is greatly improved. The ease of setting up the website and speed of responses is testament to the internet as a sampling frame. By using an online survey greater access was granted to communities that were otherwise difficult to reach in large numbers. Therefore it is important to conclude that the results of the survey are important in themselves and in the conclusions that we are able to draw from them, but the methodology is also noteworthy in the respect that a process that was underused has proved to be remarkably successful.

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<a href="http://pstalker.com/migration/mg_emig_5.htm">http://pstalker.com/migration/mg_emig_5.htm</a>	01.08.2003 – 20.11.2003
<a href="http://www.migrationexpert.com/uk/skilled_migration.asp">http://www.migrationexpert.com/uk/skilled_migration.asp</a>	10.08.2003 – 04.09.2003
<a href="http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/default.asp">http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/default.asp</a>	12.08.2003 – 10.01.2004
<a href="http://www.southern-cross-group.org">http://www.southern-cross-group.org</a>	15.08.2003 – 20.12.2003
<a href="http://www.doublezero27.com">http://www.doublezero27.com</a>	16.08.2003 – 15.09.2003
<a href="http://www.emin.geog.ucl.ac.uk">http://www.emin.geog.ucl.ac.uk</a>	20.08.2003 – 24.08.2003
<a href="http://www.iom.int">http://www.iom.int</a>	28.08.2003 – 17.12.2003
<a href="http://www.migrationinformation.org">http://www.migrationinformation.org</a>	01.09.2003 – 15.12.2003
<a href="http://sansa.nrf.ac.za">http://sansa.nrf.ac.za</a>	12.09.2003 – 14.12.2003
<a href="http://www.cartelblanche.co.za">http://www.cartelblanche.co.za</a>	30.09.2003 – 12.10.2003